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Online partisan news outlets are a thus-far scarcely studied
phenomenon made possible by changes in technology and the
media sphere that give users the possibility to not only consume
but produce their own media content (Atton, 2006; Chadwick,
2013; Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010). While this development was
initially seen as a welcome democratization of the public sphere,
it has led to a crisis of trust in mainstream knowledge-
production industries and a proliferation of polarizing partisan
information often at the expense of factual accuracy, resulting in
what some have described as the ‘post-truth era’ (D’Ancona,
2017; Sunstein, 2017).
Such websites have been called ‘fake news sites’, ‘alternative
media’ or ‘partisan news sites’ (Atton, 2006; Moffitt, 2018), but
these terms are problematic for various reasons. First, the concept
of ‘fake news’ was quickly politicized – most notably by Donald
Trump – to which the concept lends itself too easily. This is
because not all content published by these sites is ‘fake’, as in
‘made up’. Rather, they typically report on real events, but present
them with an ultrapartisan bias. Moreover, political issues are, to a
large degree, matters of interpretation. This ambiguity can be used
to resist the label ‘fake news’ on messages one is politically sympa-
thetic towards, while simultaneously brandishing it against one’s
opponents. The concept of alternative media, on the other hand,
tends to have positive normative connotations, as in providing a
(supposedly) much-needed alternative to mainstream views.
We believe our concept of countermedia to be useful in under-
standing these sites: they are media outlets, but also tend to
explicitly oppose ‘the (mainstream) media’, as well as the estab-
lishment more generally (however ambiguously defined), in a pop-
ulist style (Moffitt, 2016). Online communication has been central
to populist successes all over the world, particularly combined
with a derisive, even conspiratorial view of the mainstream media
as part of the ‘elite’ the populists oppose (Engesser et al., 2017).
We argue that countermedia employ a particular political style
(Moffitt, 2016) to differentiate themselves from the mainstream, as
do populist politicians. Following Moffitt, we define political styleas repertoires of action (Swidler, 1986) used to politicize issues
in the public – that is, how politics is done. Style is analytically dis-
tinct from the substantive content of political claims. However,
content and style are obviously interrelated, and certain content
is particularly suited to be expressed via certain styles – as we will
show. Style is not only discursive, if discourse is understood as ‘so-
cial use of language’ which ‘contributes to the ‘‘construction” of
social reality’ (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 78), since style is
not only linguistic but also embodied and performed visually and
physically. For example, populist leaders dress and act publicly in
certain stylistic ways, whether strategically or not, to claim to rep-
resent a particular constituency – ‘the common people’ – present-
ing themselves as a ‘man of the people’ (Moffitt, 2016: 28–50). The
importance of style is particularly amplified in today’s hybridly
mediated public spheres (Chadwick, 2013), in which spectacle is
vital for success. However, in the case at hand, we study style per-
formed in discourse.
Scholars of political style often see discourse – understood as
language use – as an ‘element of political style’ (Ostiguy, 2017:3),
but understanding discourse merely as language use that is part
of ‘style’ largely forgoes the broader implications of discourses as
constitutive of systems of knowledge that uphold constellations
of power with concrete outcomes. For example, it has been argued
that discursive representations of Muslims as a detestable out-
group in online discussions contribute to ‘fueling hatred’ and
may even ‘encourage physical attacks’ (Törnberg and Törnberg,
2016: 134). This is why we focus on what we call the discursive
style of a right-wing populist countermedium, the Finnish website
MV Media (WTF Media)1, and its role in the wider political and
media sphere, particularly in the politicization of migration: the pro-
cess whereby anti-immigration political actors raise the issue of
migration to the public sphere, make political claims, spread infor-
mation and appeal to emotions, particularly to a sense of crisis, to
create and utilize collective political agency to oppose immigration
(Horsti, 2015; Luhtakallio, 2012; Moffitt, 2016). As such, our study
of discursive style takes cues both from earlier studies on political
style (e.g. Moffitt, 2016; Ostiguy, 2017) and of political discourse
(e.g. Atton, 2006; Horsti, 2015; Törnberg and Törnberg, 2016;
Wodak, 2015). The focus on discourse is taken because of the text-e Fuck?!
.
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point to better incorporate the discursive construction of social real-
ity. The focus on style is employed because stylistic repertoires are
central to populist mobilization.
We conduct a mixed-methods text analysis, combining compu-
tational (Törnberg and Törnberg, 2016) and discourse-analytical
(Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012) methodology, complemented
with literature on populist style (Moffitt, 2016), to answer the
questions: What defines the countermedia discursive style and
how does it differ frommainstreammedia style? Is the counterme-
dia style also used in the arena of ‘high politics’ (i.e. Parliament),
and if so, how and by whom?
The Finnish case is particularly relevant because after decades
of political stability and coalition governments by moderate par-
ties, the political system was shocked in 2011 by the explosive suc-
cess of the radical right-wing populist Finns Party, in 2015 by their
inclusion in government, and in 2017 by their split into a moderate
and a hard-line anti-immigration faction. During these years, the
meteoric rise of right-wing populism has been strongly fuelled
by online anti-immigration activism (Hatakka, 2017), a network
that includes WTF Media. And immigration has indeed been suc-
cessfully politicized, as it has become one of the central polarizing
issues of Finnish politics along a liberal–conservative axis
(Westinen, 2015).
The analysis proceeds in four phases: (1) we computationally
identify key expressions in WTF’s discursive style by comparing
it to mainstream media; (2) we qualitatively analyse WTF’s discur-
sive style; (3) we search for these countermedia-typical expres-
sions in the Finnish parliament and quantify their prevalence to
assess the relevance of the countermedia style for politics; (4) we
qualitatively analyse how Finnish parliamentarians use the coun-
termedia style to discuss immigration. The results of our analysis
show that the countermedium in question politicizes immigration
in the characteristically populist style of performing crisis; that is,
it attempts to politicize migration and frame it as a threat, to ulti-
mately affect public opinion. Furthermore, together with its polit-
ical allies on the populist right, WTF Media seems to be somewhat
successful, judging from the prevalence of countermedia-style
expressions in parliament, particularly by the right-wing populist
Finns Party. But when politicians use this style in the high-
political arena of parliament, they employ what we call a ‘politi-
cian’s filter’ in order to appear credible (see Ostiguy, 2017); this
is a balancing act, however, if they also wish to retain the ‘man
of the people’ appeal of the populist style.2 Helsingin Sanomat occupies an exceptionally important position in the Finnish
media landscape since its circulation is more than three times that of the nearest
competitor, Aamulehti, and in fact largest in all of the Nordic countries.2. Data
This study is based on three datasets: a countermedia dataset
(WTF), a mainstream media dataset for comparison (HS; intro-
duced below), and parliamentarians’ addresses to the floor in ple-
nary sessions of the Finnish parliament.
WTF is the most influential right-wing populist countermedium
in Finland (Ylä-Anttila, 2018), similar to, if less professional than,
Breitbart News in the USA, and comparable to Fdesouche in France.
WTF Media quickly rose to the top 20 most popular Finnish web-
sites in 2015, despite being branded by the mainstream media as
‘fake news’ or a ‘hate site’ that should not be trusted (Kaleva,
2015; YLE, 2016). It resembles a tabloid magazine, but does not
adhere to journalistic standards, and frequently publishes uncon-
firmed rumours of crimes committed by immigrants as news.
Other pieces are based on police reports or mainstream media sto-
ries and describe actual events; by no means is all the content
‘made up’. The site has an explicit anti-immigration agenda cou-
pled with a vulgar style, claiming to uncover ‘the ugly truth’ about
immigration that ‘the mainstream media has silenced’. The impor-tance of WTF Media for Finnish public debates on immigration and
‘post-truth politics’ – that is, challenging knowledge authorities –
has been significant.
We included in our analysis all articles published by WTF Media
between 1 January 2015 and 31 December 2017 that were avail-
able on its site, mvlehti.net, on 20 January 2018. The article titles
and body text were extracted using the BeautifulSoup Python
library, discarding formatting, images and links. The resulting data-
set contained 2,059,592 words in 15,015 articles.
For purposes of comparison, we used the full archive of all con-
tent published in Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Finland’s main daily
newspaper2, during the same timeframe (2015–2017). This data
was kindly provided to us by the newspaper itself and totalled
26,025,060 words in 131,957 articles. This dataset enabled us to
compare WTF to arguably the most mainstream news media outlet
in Finland.
The third dataset, the minutes of the plenary sessions of the Fin-
nish parliament, was provided by the Language Bank of Finland.
This data was not available for 2017; the latest published minutes
are from summer 2016. However, the year 2015 is contained in full
(which was a particularly important year for the migration debate,
as the number of asylum-seekers peaked in September 2015 at
more than 30-fold that of a typical month). The third dataset con-
tains the full transcripts of Parliament between January 2015 and
June 2016 – that is, 183 parliamentary sessions, 6,819 speeches,
and 3,354,519 words.3. Methods
We take a mixed-methods approach to text analysis, which
combines computational methods with qualitative discourse anal-
ysis (e.g. Bail, 2014; Hillard et al., 2008; Laaksonen et al., 2017;
Törnberg and Törnberg, 2016). The role of computational methods
is not to replace qualitative analysis, but to complement it. The aim
is to combine the ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) of close reading
with the representativeness, reproducibility and quantifiability of
computational ‘distant reading’ (Babones, 2016) in a ‘best of both
worlds’ approach. By computing frequencies of word sequences
we can describe the numerical properties of a text (such as the
prevalence of a particular expression), and then select samples
for qualitative analysis in a representative and reproducible way,
avoiding some of the human bias in sampling. This two-stage anal-
ysis was conducted first for the countermedia dataset and then for
the parliamentary dataset, making for a total of four distinct anal-
ysis phases, described below.
First, using Python’s Natural Language Toolkit, we identified
countermedia-specific expressions used in debates on migration
by comparing the frequencies of n-grams (sequences of words) in
WTF Media and HS, and selected a sample of the most typical
WTF posts based on this comparison. Second, we conducted a qual-
itative discourse analysis of the sample informed by Moffitt’s
(2016) work on political style, using the qualitative analysis soft-
ware Atlas.TI. To ensure sensitivity to the data, we utilize the prin-
ciple of ‘multiple coding’ (Barbour, 2001), that is, inductive and
reflexive collaborative coding, in which each researcher closely
read an equally-sized portion of the sample, then met to discuss
the themes and recurring stylistic repertoires we found, compare
and harmonize the coding scheme, and finally re-coded their por-
tion of material in accordance with the commonly agreed features
of interest. Third, we searched for these countermedia expressions
(n-grams) in the parliamentary dataset and described their
Table 1
The fifteen most common two-word sequences (bigrams) in WTF Media, excluding
proper nouns, translated into English. Inflected forms of words were lemmatized, that
is, ‘police request’ includes ‘police requests’, ‘police requested’ etc.
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these expressions in parliament, again based on an inductive, col-
laborative and reflexive qualitative discourse analysis in Atlas.TI3.Bigram Frequency
police report 2201
source police 2164
last year 854
social media 700
photo police 692
police request 659
large share 652
to catch [a criminal] 510
photo [of the] day 493
Finland first 491
illegally [in the] country 471
time between 458
video [of the] day 455
sexual abuse 434
young man 425
Table 2
Comparison of relative frequencies of bigrams in WTF and HS. Inflected forms of
words were lemmatized, that is, ‘police publish’ includes ‘police publishes’, ‘police
published’ etc.
Bigram Relative frequency
in WTF
Relative frequency
in HS
Ratio
request report 0.0001792 0.0000015 123
police inform 0.0010687 0.0000090 119
inform police 0.0001262 0.0000011 117
steal property 0.0000646 0.0000011 58
request information 0.0000816 0.0000015 56
can notify 0.0001316 0.0000024 55
photo large 0.0000471 0.0000009 53
police publish 0.0001554 0.0000030 53
time between 0.0000583 0.0000011 52
44. Phase 1: Computational analysis of WTF Media
N-grams are simply sequences of words in a corpus of text –
that is, words that occur in a particular order. Bigrams are
sequences of two words: for example, the bigram ‘computational
analysis’ occurs once in the heading above. A count of such fre-
quencies gives a general idea of the most common themes and
tones in a text. A significant part of WTF Media’s content seems
to be reporting on crimes allegedly committed by migrants, partic-
ularly sexual assaults. The most common bigrams inWTF were ‘po-
lice report’ (2201 occurrences), and ‘source: police’ (2164
occurrences) (see Table 1). We also calculated frequencies for tri-
grams (three-word sequences), but only use bigrams in the analy-
sis for the sake of simplicity, since the results using trigrams were
very similar.
To identify the kinds of expressions that are typical of WTF
Media in particular, we compared the WTF bigram frequencies to
the HS dataset, representing mainstream media text (see
Bossetta, 2017; Daniels, 2017 for methodological analogues). Con-
trary to WTF, the most common bigrams in HS are predictably not
about crime and immigration, but general, neutral and descriptive
in nature: last year, million euros, large part, billion euros, next
year, and so on. We computed a list of the 100,000 most common
bigrams in WTF and looked up the relative frequency (occurrences
per total words in dataset) of each bigram in HS to see which were
disproportionately represented in WTF. A sample of this compar-
ison can be found in Table 2.
Many bigrams were such that their mere appearance could not
be considered indicative of discourse typical to WTF: politicians’
names, for example, as well as general expressions related to crime
and police. Furthermore, our primary interest was in the politiciza-
tion of migration. Thus, we turned to the interpretive side of our
mixed-methods approach. With the help of a research assistant,
we considered two lists: the 400 most common bigrams in WTF
that did not appear in HS at all, and the 400 most common bigrams
in WTF that appeared much more often in WTF than in HS, sorted
by ratio (Table 2). From these lists, we selected those that were
related to immigration or nationalism as determined by at least
three of four coders. Proper nouns (the names of individuals and
organizations) were excluded. The result of this qualitative selec-
tion is a list of the 67 most countermedia-typical bigrams used
for discussing migration (Table 3). To reiterate, we first computa-
tionally listed bigrams in order of how much more common they
were in our countermedia data than in our mainstreammedia data,
then qualitatively selected the bigrams related to the politicization
of immigration.
These expressions reflect how WTF discusses immigration:
through vocabularies of crime and legal status, as well as the
nation, nationalism, terrorism, and Islam. The bigrams capture
both thematic content and style: they do not just refer to a partic-
ular issue (immigration), but include certain interpretations of
those issues – a focus on illegality, crime, race, the nation, and
gender.
For the qualitative phase, we took a sample of 27 WTF Media
articles by selecting those in which one or more of the 67 bigrams
in Table 3 occur at least 12 times. This is based on an elbow cut-off
of the frequency of the immigration-related, countermedia-typical
bigrams in WTF articles. The bigrams were concentrated in certain
articles, and it was those that we selected for our qualitative sam-3 Codebooks available upon request.ple, leaving out the ‘long tail’ of articles in which the bigrams were
mentioned only sparsely. This sample, used in Phase 2, consists of
28,031 words.
5. Phase 2: Qualitative analysis of the countermedia style
In this analysis, we argue that the countermedia discursive style
forms a seedbed for political mobilization based on collective iden-
tification as disentitled, disenfranchised and victimized, the result-
ing resentment of which is often harnessed to support populist
politics (Hochschild, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2006). Below, we analyse
five elements of the countermedia style: depictions of internal ene-
mies, a dualist stance towards authorities, struggles over concepts,
majority victimization, and vulgarity.
To start with, one dominant feature of the countermedia style is
its descriptions of ‘internal enemies’, a tool typical to populism. In
the case of WTF, this means above all the so-called suvakit, ‘tole-
tards’ (a portmanteau of ‘tolerant’ and ‘retard’): the liberal ‘useful
idiots’ who tolerate immigration. WTF argues that priests, aca-
demics, green–left politicians and of course pro-migration activists
are internal enemies who facilitate the attack supposedly being
carried out by external enemies (i.e. Muslim immigrants, by and
large).
The political green–left wing, in collaboration with the unpatri-
otic liberal bourgeoisie, are going to rot the education system,
too. (WTF 10 Nov 2017)4All quotations have been translated from Finnish by the authors. WTF often re-
publishes other sites’ posts verbatim, and does not always make this clear. We
assume content nevertheless reflects WTF Media’s positions.
Table 3
The most WTF-typical bigrams related to immigration or nationalism, proper nouns
excluded, translated into English and sorted into thematic categories.
Migration and refugees Crime and
illegality
Nation and
nationalism
country stay illegal migrant own people
asylum-seeker tell country illegally Finnish interest
persecution flee illegally country country people
political asylum illegally Finland Finnish person
country stay illegal immigrant Finnish justice
deport country illegal intruder Western society
stay Finland illegal immigration Finnish taxpayer
return homeland deport country Finland people
open border illegal incomer taxpayer money
country intrude Finnish safety against Finnish
let [into] country illegally stay Finnish tradition
immigration
multiculturalism
illegally country national resistance
close border illegal Muslim Finnish against
multicultural society illegal dweller
Sweden migration [office]
reception-center chief
Islam and terrorism Race and racism Gender and ethnicity
Islamic terrorism against incite foreign man
young Muslim group against foreign-born man
Islamic country ethnic background dark-skinned man
peace religion incite group white woman
Islam religion anti racist white person
political Islam ethnic profiling
Allahu Akbar
Muslim do
religion culture
Muslim Christian
violent radicalize
Helsinki Muslim
with Muslim
4 T. Ylä-Anttila et al. / Discourse, Context & Media 32 (2019) 100326As is typical of populist argumentation, elites make up one cat-
egory of internal enemies in our countermedia sample, and include
government ministers, EU officials and the mainstream media.
Politicians are accused of being unable to criticize Islam because
of their excessive ‘tactfulness’ (WTF 30 May 2017), for example –
an explicit denunciation of the ‘high’ political style, that is, well-
behaved professionalism, which Ostiguy (2017) notes is the oppo-
site of populist political style. In arguments blaming elites, the nat-
ure of the countermedia as populist opposition media (both
towards the establishment and towards the mainstream media)
is made clear.
This church propaganda about aid for migrants is advocated by
the Church Resources Agency, led by millionaire Jukka Alho,
who became known, when he was CEO of the Itella logistics cor-
poration from 2009 to 2011, for receiving over a million euros in
pension bonuses. (WTF 31 Dec 2016)
The category of internal enemies often overlaps with that of
authorities, such as the police and the mainstreammedia, to which
WTFhas adualist stance: they are respected inprinciplebut strongly
condemned when they are perceived as failing to protect the inter-
ests of the people. For example, the mainstream media were often
accused byWTF of not being politically neutral. This is noteworthy,
considering that WTF itself is decidedly non-neutral. WTF seems to
see itself as fulfilling a different function than the mainstream
media. This is an acknowledgement of the importance of the inde-
pendent press in principle, though its current form is accused of
being corrupt. Particularly YLE, the Finnish national broadcaster, is
singled out as an instrument of ‘propaganda’:
YLE is learning to operate as effectively as the Soviet media,
which always checked the facts and told the people ‘what they
should think about this issue’. (WTF 23 Aug 2017)Similarly, WTF gives a central role to the police and their fight
against ‘illegal immigration’ and the resulting threats to safety.
Such stories proliferate in WTF and are presented in an over-
whelmingly positive manner. According to WTF, the police are pro-
tecting the country against ‘infiltrated terrorist agents’, but their
efforts are thwarted by a lack of support from indifferent or corrupt
legislators: ‘Authorities are powerless until the legislation is
updated’ (WTF 29 May 2017). In several articles, WTF defends
police officers who have spoken publicly about immigrants in a
derogatory and discriminatory manner, and accusations of hate
speech are viewed as ‘stupidities’ (WTF 26 Sep 2017) that under-
mine police work. The police are also contrasted with the church,
which is accused of ‘irresponsibly’ protecting immigrants despite
the danger they represent to society and to native Finns. And police
officers that speak out in favour of immigration or multicultural-
ism are strongly denounced as ‘political’; fromWTF’s point of view,
they are traitors of the people.
Political debates are always also about the concepts and conno-
tations used in discourse, as well as the power relations and con-
ceptions of justice carried by these concepts. WTF engages in this
conceptual struggle not only implicitly, by using a particular style
which furthers its representations and agendas, but also explicitly,
such as in articles openly discussing what terms should be used to
refer to migrants ‘realistically’ – that is, to emphasize features that
are important for an anti-immigration agenda. As we showed pre-
viously, a typical framing is that of ‘illegal’ immigrants, which is
preferred to ‘undocumented’ by WTF because it is said to be more
‘accurate’. Despite this appeal to accuracy, WTF often refers to
immigrants as ‘illegal’ without providing any information about
the actual legal status of the person in question. The following quo-
tation demonstrates this conceptual struggle. Note the internal
enemy definition, as well.
Samuli Suonpää, who has risen to the position of communica-
tions planner in the [Finnish Evangelical Lutheran] Church by
scheming and personal connections [. . .] incorrectly uses the
word ‘undocumented’, even though in fact many illegals do
have documents, just not the right documents to make it legal
for them to stay in the country. (WTF 23 Mar 2017)
WTF commonly frames the majority as being victimized by
minorities, above all immigrants, who ‘cut in line’ (Hochschild,
2016). Asylum seekers are portrayed as ‘terrorists in disguise’
whose victims are the ‘Finnish people’. Aside from actual violent
terrorism, this theme is typically linked to welfare redistribution
through unsourced anecdotes marked by bombastic hyperbole:
This is equality à la Titanic [. . .] family men take along fertile
women and herds of children. [. . .] The road to a five-star water-
front penthouse opens easily in municipalities’ residential ser-
vices, as the guidelines perverted by the green–leftists put
those presenting themselves as the most wretched at the front
of the line. (WTF 4 Oct 2015)
Our sample is rife with similar urban tales of welfare abuse,
such as a refugee woman ordering 300,000 euros worth of products
by mail to a German reception centre (WTF 24 Jul 2016) and the
Finnish Ministry of the Interior planning preferential treatment
in social services for ISIS fighters (WTF 10 Nov 2017). Such anec-
dotes narrate majority-victimizing welfare abuse as enabled not
only by internal enemies – particularly the toletards – but also
by the unwitting benevolent majority itself.
Finally, WTF uses an explicit, imaginatively vulgar style to rein-
force the general tone of ridicule, resentment and threat. For exam-
ple, a post argued that elites harness ‘a demagogy that cries about
otherness and diversity’ to help in ‘fingering the minorities
ombudsman under her skirt’ (WTF 4 Oct 2015), and another one
Fig. 1. Frequency of countermedia-style immigration-related expressions in the
Finnish parliament January 2015–June 2016.
T. Ylä-Anttila et al. / Discourse, Context & Media 32 (2019) 100326 5identified ‘toletard priestesses’ who ‘sordidly sob’ as ‘authorities
devise decisive control measures’ against illegal immigration
(WTF 3 Apr 2017). As illustrated, the vulgarity often comes with
misogyny. The ‘richness [of multiculturalism] can only be mea-
sured in the numbers of bodies mutilated by Muslim terrorists’,
and once it is too late to take action, the only thing left to do will
be to ‘eat shit and die’ (WTF 24 Jul 2016).
To conclude, our analysis illustrates how the countermedia
style constructs an overarching sense of disenfranchisement and
malcontent, which is central to populist mobilization (e.g.
Bonikowski, 2017; Hochschild, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2006), through
elements such as internal enemies, a dualist stance towards
authorities, conceptual struggles, majority-victimization, and vul-
garity. Some of these elements are extensively documented previ-
ously in the literature on anti-immigrant discourse (e.g. on enemy
constructions see Törnberg and Törnberg, 2016), others, such as
vulgar style, have thus far received little attention and may be
somewhat specific to the case at hand.13 
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Fig. 2. Use of countermedia-style expressions about immigration in the Finnish
parliament by party, January 2015–June 2016.6. Phase 3: Finding the countermedia style in parliament
In the next phase, we looked at whether Finnish politicians use
expressions similar to those of WTF Media – and if so, which politi-
cians and when. This was done by searching for the countermedia-
typical immigration-related bigrams in a third dataset consisting of
politicians’ speeches. For this purpose, we used the minutes of the
plenary sessions of the Finnish parliament between January 2015
and June 2016, which were provided by the Language Bank of Fin-
land. This timeframe spans two governments: the rainbow coali-
tion led by the moderate-right National Coalition until summer
2015, and the right-wing coalition led by the Centre Party, includ-
ing the right-wing populist Finns Party, from summer 2015
onwards.
44 of the 67 countermedia-typical bigrams were indeed used
even in the high-political arena of Parliament – perhaps even sur-
prisingly often (Fig. 1) – but the 23 bigrams that were not used5
include some of the most explicit references to Muslims and skin
colour. This suggests that even fiercely anti-immigrant or anti-
Islam politicians filter their speech in Parliament in order to not
appear explicitly racist, as we argue below.
The frequency of countermedia-typical phrases peaked in Jan-
uary of 2015, when the parliament debated a government proposal
to extend public healthcare provision to undocumented migrants
(a proposal which did not pass). It is notable that the Finns Party
was in opposition at the time and obviously heavily opposed the
proposal. Previous research has shown that politicians tend to
intensify their populist appeals when in opposition (Bonikowski
and Gidron, 2016; Ernst et al., 2017). However, the ‘refugee crisis’
of autumn 2015 is also visible as a momentary increase in
countermedia-typical expressions in Parliament in October,
November and December of 2015, as seen in Fig. 1.
As shown in Fig. 2, the anti-immigration right-wing populist
Finns Party strongly dominates in the usage of countermedia-
style bigrams about immigration. However, it should be noted that
not every mention of ‘illegal immigration’, for instance, is an anti-
immigration expression. Some MPs use the expressions to refer to
the discourse of their opponents. In the case of the Left Alliance, for
example, the use of countermedia expressions is largely an artefact
of MP Anna Kontula’s speeches in which she criticizes the Finns5 The 23 bigrams we did not find in parliamentary speeches were Allahu Akbar,
Helsinki Muslim, Islamic terrorism, national resistance, against incite, incite group,
illegal intruder, illegal Muslim, with Muslim, Muslim Christian, Muslim do, young
Muslim, political Islam, peace religion, Sweden migration [office], Finnish tradition,
dark-skinned man, foreign man, foreign-born man, white person, white woman,
against group, violent radicalize.Party for referring to people as ‘illegals’. Still, Fig. 2. gives an overall
impression of which parties most often use this language, and from
the qualitative analysis which follows, it is evident that the vast
majority of such usage is indeed anti-immigration discourse, rather
than criticism of it.
The qualitative sample for Phase 4 was selected similarly to the
selection of the Phase 2 sample. A search of the 6820 total
addresses to the floor delivered between January 2015 and June
2016 for the 67 countermedia-style bigrams resulted in 298
addresses. We then sorted these addresses by the number of
countermedia-style bigrams they contained and identified an
elbow cut-off at three bigrams per address.
Using this criterion, we selected a sample of 21 addresses that is
manageable in scope for qualitative analysis (24,257 words), and
roughly matches the size of the Phase 2 qualitative corpus
(28,031 words). The distribution of sample addresses across polit-
ical parties is strongly Finns Party -dominated, as is the usage of
countermedia-style expressions in the broader dataset, indicating
that right-wing populist MPs use the countermedia style for debat-
ing immigration much more commonly than other MPs (in the
qualitative subsample of 21 addresses, 13 are by Finns Party
MPs, 3 by National Coalition MPs, 3 by Social Democrats MPs, 1
by a Centre Party MP and 1 by a Left Alliance MP).
As a final indicator before moving on to the qualitative analysis,
we looked at the density of countermedia-style bigrams in parlia-
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common such expressions are in countermedia than in Parliament.
The 524 instances of countermedia-style bigrams in the WTF
Media subsample made up 3.7% of the subsample’s 28,031 words;
the density was roughly six times that of the parliamentary
speeches (82 bigrams in 24,527 words, or 0.7%), even though both
subsamples contain those documents in which the bigrams occur
most often. Additionally, as noted above, 23 of the 67 bigrams
are not present in the parliamentary data at all. This suggests that
MPs use a ‘politician’s filter’ when discussing immigration to
appear credible. However, there is considerable variation in how
strict this filter is, as we will show below.
7. Phase 4: Qualitative analysis of the countermedia style in
parliament
The immigration-related phenomena in the parliamentary sam-
ple are thematically very similar to the WTF Media sample. How-
ever, partly because the parliamentary sample includes the
January 2015 debate over healthcare for undocumented migrants,
the parliamentary data exhibits a more concentrated focus on the
‘illegal’ status of certain migrants.
The countermedia style does not typically define a complete
address to the parliamentary floor, but rather manifests in concen-
trated passages in the addresses, often preceded and followed by
more typical political language aimed at mainstream audiences.
This ‘politician’s filter’ is used to restrain the use of countermedia
style in the parliament, rendering the addresses more ‘ordinary’
and allowing politicians to simultaneously appeal to both radical
and moderate constituents.
The authoritarian emphasis on control and safety is perhaps the
most notable commonality in how the countermedia style of
debating immigration is harnessed in both WTF and in Parliament.
The Finns Party MPs are not alone in underlining the importance of
authorities’ resources to control immigration, with mainstream
politicians also using the language of ‘illegality’. The following
excerpt exemplifies how using a strict politician’s filter allows an
MP to present himself as a level-headed proponent of the bare
minimum measures necessary to ensure the authorities’ capabili-
ties to maintain control:
The healthcare system should at least acknowledge that [. . .]
the person in question is illegally residing in the country, and
at least at some stage [. . .] convey this information to the
authorities responsible for monitoring legal or illegal residence.
(Mauri Pekkarinen, Centre Party, 28 Jan 2015)The Finns Party was the most vocal in invoking citizens’ fears,
presenting themselves as the upholders of safety. As in WTF Media,
parliamentary addresses by Finns Party MPs characterized
migrants as criminals, positioning Finnish women and children
as the most vulnerable members of society and at risk of becoming
victims of violence perpetrated by ‘foreigners’ and ‘illegal’
immigrants:
The people are worried over whether it is safe to walk the
streets [. . .] [H]ow can we protect our children, our girls and
women on the streets, without having the law act as a deterrent
for people who do not respect this kind of legislation? (Mika
Niikko, Finns Party, 11 Feb 2016)The control and safety elements of the countermedia style are
commonly linked to taking a stand against the profoundly different
immigrant Other, who is identified as the main source of insecu-
rity. Such paternalistic and authoritarian language on security iscommon in essentialist nationalism, which may also seek to
explain the immigrant’s role in the alleged erosion of safety as
deriving from irreconcilable value systems:
They have completely dissimilar human values and a different
understanding of how society should be built around here.
(Mika Niikko, Finns Party, 24 May 2016)
Performing crisis (Moffitt, 2016) is a prominent feature of the
countermedia style through which both WTF Media and populist
politicians commonly articulate urgent threats to safety. As it is
based on alarmist depictions of immigration-related threats, such
claims are not easily softened by the politician’s filter. Finns Party
MPs, in particular, are heavily engaged in not only reacting to the
‘refugee crisis’, but actually performing it through references to
‘immigrant crime’ in all its forms – drugs, terrorism, rape and
murder:
We have had enough with the rapes and robberies. Now is the
time for measures. Next spring will be too late. Then the land-
slide of incomers will be uncontrollable, if we don’t take serious
action now. Soon we, too, will have slums where violence, drugs
and terror reign supreme [. . .] Currently, we are integrating ISIS
fighters here, even those who have been identified as perpetra-
tors of 11 murders in that country of theirs. (Teuvo Hakkarai-
nen, Finns Party, 15 Dec 2015)
The crisis being performed is not restricted to crime alone, but
also incorporates threats to safety vis-à-vis social and economic
conditions, articulating a slippery slope whereby an influx of innu-
merable immigrants will bring an end to the whole system of wel-
fare redistribution:
[T]he whole system cannot function in any way if the paperless
are given even a temporary residence permit, because this
would mean that the paperless can access our blissful income
support, for instance. And how many paperless migrants,
declining to return to their home countries, are there in Europe?
One million, two – who knows how many million? We cannot
resolve these things so that we lower the threshold so low that
no one needs to adhere to any laws here. (Mika Niikko, Finns
Party, 11 Feb 2016)
Occasionally, politicians from the mainstream right employ a
similar discursive strategy of instilling doubt and worry. In these
cases, the politician’s filter can manifest in verbose expressions
of his or her utmost reluctance to perform crisis:
I, myself, do try to avoid painting pictures of unnecessary
threats, but as we already know today, next year we will have
thousands of people with negative asylum decisions who will
stay in Finland – people residing illegally in Finland. I don’t
think it can be regarded as an unnecessarily emphasized threat
that the more expansive the social and health services they
have, [. . .] the harder it is to make them leave Finland voluntar-
ily. (Ben Zyskowicz, National Coalition, 2 Dec 2015)
The above excerpt illustrates that many features of the counter-
media style, such as the performance of crisis and support for
authoritarian control, often have a distinct connection to the moral,
nationalist dimension of the welfare state (Pyrhönen, 2015). This
anti-immigration discourse is based on the assertion that the wel-
fare state and its benefits should apply to Finns alone – whether
defined via citizenship or some other standard of belonging to
the Finnish nation.
While the moral condemnation of ‘welfare abuse’ features
highly in both WTF and in Parliament, the subject matter of the
parliamentary debates – health care and social services – creates
even more room for anecdotal evidence of non-Finns ‘cutting in
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the provision of publicly-funded healthcare to irregular migrants
highlight a focus on moral deservingness, in which MPs assert that
– unlike immigrants – Finns have a moral right to access these
state-provided services. ‘Illegal’ immigrant status is commonly
presented as a moral justification for considering migrants unde-
serving of economically costly healthcare, and, paradoxically, the
fact that granting a migrant legal status would allow ‘unjust’ access
to these services is used as justification for not granting such
status:
Public services are not meant for illegal people who could come
here and enjoy the same level of health services as Finnish cit-
izens and those legally residing in the country. (Vesa-Matti
Saarakkala, Finns Party, 13 Mar 2015)
Similar arguments that build on the notion of undeservingness
appear commonly in both WTF and in Parliament. However, in the
latter context, the politician’s filter frames welfare nationalist
arguments in a more technocratic and rationalist manner than
the pure countermedia style would allow. In this argument, the
cost of welfare is addressed in economic terms, thereby obscuring
the intimate connection between the normative (deservingness)
and rationalist (economic) realms. Accordingly, parliamentary
addresses by traditional centre–right politicians tend to embrace
the economic frame as ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’, as opposed to the
right-wing populists’ explicitly moralistic framing.
The politician’s filter also affects how immigrants are depicted
in welfare nationalist passages. Parliamentary addresses empha-
sizing the moral dimension of welfare nationalism are common
among Finns Party MPs, who argue – exactly like the WTF Media
articles do – that immigrants are ‘intruders’ and, as such, morally
reprehensible. When MPs from other parties use welfare national-
ist arguments, they are often filtered through an economic frame
that portrays immigrants simply as rational human beings. Accord-
ing to this claim, these people – just like any other people – will
invariably take advantage of welfare services unless the MPs devise
specific legislation to prevent this:
It is claimed that expanding welfare provision to undocu-
mented immigrants wouldn’t constitute an incentive for immi-
grants to come to Finland. But there are no studies to prove such
a claim. I don’t believe this would result in whole populations
coming here, but I do believe people will do what’s rational
and logical for themselves. (Ben Zyskowicz, National Coalition,
28 Jan 2015)
As such, while the ‘raw’ and ‘filtered’ flavours of welfare nation-
alism are both used to present anti-immigration arguments, they
propagate different perceptions of the humanity of migrants.
Right-wing populist politicians favour the raw variant, arguing that
the autochthonous population is profoundly different from the
immigrants who prey on the vulnerabilities of the Finnish system
and the Finnish population alike. The politician-filtered framing
favoured by centre–right MPs, on the other hand, presents the eco-
nomically erosive effect of the basic human self-interest of
migrants as a reason to curb immigration.
Finally, there is one prevalent feature of the countermedia style
in the parliamentary corpus that is completely monopolized by the
right-wing populist Finns Party: the practice of positioning politi-
cal opponents as internal enemies of ‘the people’. The explicit man-
ifestations of this enemy category refer to either specific politicians
or to the whole political process, and are conveyed through expres-
sions of outrage that are hard to differentiate from passages inWTF
Media:
The green–left fools have spent the whole autumn yelling about
every single budget cut in the parliament. Never have they saida word against the half a billion euros of extra funding that is
currently being spent to maintain the infiltrators’ benefits.
(Teuvo Hakkarainen, Finns Party, 15 Dec 2015)
The Finns do not accept the proposed bill, and we regard it as an
outright expression of ridicule towards the Finnish people [. . .]
[T]he impudence of bringing this kind of proposal here is
incomprehensible. (Hanna Mäntylä, Finns Party, 28 Jan 2015)
This positioning is also employed in a more implicit fashion,
whereby a self-depreciating ‘low style’ underlines the MP’s own
role as a person ‘of the people’, an underdog challenger to ‘the
elite’:
Listening to these addresses coming from the mouths of profes-
sional politicians, we bow as they use words fancy enough to
certainly bring even a telephone pole to its knees right here.
They refer to small children and such things [. . .] This parlia-
ment has lost touch with the citizens, the ordinary people.
(Teuvo Hakkarainen, Finns Party, 28 Jan 2015)
Occasionally, MPs reluctant to employ this position themselves
nevertheless lend support to those who do adopt this position:
MP Hakkarainen’s address was the kind of speech from a man of
the people that comes directly from the heart and from the
deepest of human emotions, and in this sense I respect that
someone calls things by their proper names, even if those kinds
of people may sometimes be misinterpreted. (Mika Niikko,
Finns Party, 11 Feb 2016)
This method of harnessing the countermedia style allows politi-
cians to both endorse and transcend the ‘lowest’ registers (Ostiguy
2017) of the countermedia style, positioning themselves simulta-
neously as men of the people and as respectable politicians.
8. Conclusions
This paper has utilised computational and qualitative discourse
analysis to examine the discursive style of a right-wing populist
countermedium, WTF, and its role in the Finnish public and polit-
ical spheres. We have argued that the concept of countermedia is
useful for understanding hyper-politicized online news outlets that
engage in a type of ‘citizen journalism’ and position themselves in
opposition to the mainstream media and the broader establish-
ment, attempting to influence public opinion by discursive means.
And we have shown, both qualitatively and quantitatively, that the
countermedia style is indeed used even in parliamentary debates,
which should highlight the relevance of studying countermedia.
In Phase 1, we identified the countermedia style of debating
immigration by comparing the bigram frequencies of WTF and
HS, and found that WTF Media discusses migration mostly in con-
junction with crime and illegality, the police, and safety, in a crisis-
performing populist style.
In Phase 2, we conducted a qualitative, interpretive analysis of
the countermedia style identified in Phase 1, finding an overarch-
ing incitement of sense of disenfranchisement using the elements
of internal enemies, a dualist stance towards authorities, concep-
tual struggles, majority victimization, and vulgarity.
In Phase 3, we identified and measured the use of
countermedia-typical expressions in the Finnish parliament. We
found that the frequency of usage peaked in January 2015 with
the debate over migrant healthcare, with a second wave of usage
in late autumn 2015, co-occurring with the peak in asylum appli-
cations. The Finns Party MPs used this language more often than
others.
In Phase 4, we qualitatively analysed the usage of
countermedia-typical expressions in Parliament. We found that
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countermedia style. Politicians wishing to channel the power of
populism and present themselves as being ‘of the people’ face a
balancing act: it is not possible for an MP to fully embrace the
scaremongering, crisis-performing populist countermedia style
and appear credible at the same time, at least not in the Finnish
context at this point in time. Some politicians come fairly close,
however.
Finally, some caveats. We do not imply that the countermedia-
style expressions used by MPs would necessarily be drawn directly
from the countermedia, although surely some politicians do read
these websites and appropriate their messages. Rather, there is a
more widely used discursive style of politicizing migration that
both the countermedia and right-wing populist politicians tap into
and utilize (see e.g. Horsti, 2015; Törnberg and Törnberg, 2016;
Wodak, 2015). This study provides further evidence that this dis-
cursive style is fairly international and can be applied not only to
overtly political communication (e.g. party or activist group plat-
forms) but also to re-frame news events to create hyper-partisan
news media. Further research could assess some of the shortcom-
ings of this study; for example, to what extent are the features
found here specific to a) countermedia as a format as opposed to
other forms of communication, b) Finland as a polity and a national
public sphere? Such assessments could be done by comparing
countermedia not only to mainstream media, as we have done,
but to other forms of anti-immigration communication, and Fin-
nish countermedia to other countries. Also, one could study the
possible change in discursive style over time. Our perception cer-
tainly is that ever-more transgressive and radical language is
becoming more and more common even on the high-political
arena in Finland, as elsewhere.Funding
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